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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(j) as a transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. The 
judgment being appealed has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Order Dismissing Case as 
to Defendants Woolsey, Record at 188, 191. 
4 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in holding that a defendant private property owner is 
not subject to suit for equitable relief or private nuisance damages for construction 
of a home in a manner allegedly constituting a nuisance to plaintiffs on the basis 
that the city in which Plaintiffs' and Defendants' properties are located had 
approved the construction of the home by issuing a building permit? 
The order dismissing the case as to the Defendant private property owners 
(Woolseys) cites both Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) and Rule 56(c) 
(summary judgment) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of 
review for both an order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment 
under Rule 56(c) is one of correctness, with the appellate court granting no 
deference to the trial court. Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 
1999); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d497, 499 (Utah 1989). Furthermore, in 
considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court 
views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
These issues were preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Record at 98. 
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STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth in Addendum to Brief) 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth in Addendum to Brief) 
South Weber City Zoning Code, Section 10-5A-5: 
"All buildings and structures shall be located as provided in Chapter 11 of 
this Title and as follows: Structure - Dwellings: Front Setback - 30 feet from all 
front lot lines. Side setback - 10 feet minimum on each side, except 20 feet 
minimum for side fronting on a street. Rear setback - 30 feet." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiffs filed suit in Second District Court against Defendants for 
nuisance and injunctive relief Complaint, Record at 1. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Motion to Dismiss, Record at 89. The Court granted 
Defendants' motion in an Order entered on March 29, 2004. Order, Record at 
188. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs (Popperts) and Defendants (Woolseys) own neighboring 
(adjoining) properties in South Weber City. Complaint, Record at 1-2. 
Defendants Woolseys applied to South Weber City to construct a home on their 
property based on construction drawings they submitted to the City. Affidavit of 
Mark Larsen, Record at 67-70. The City approved the construction and issued a 
building permit, finding, inter alia, that the boundary between Plaintiffs' and 
Defendants' properties could qualify as a side lot line rather than a rear lot line for 
purposes of zoning setback requirements under South Weber City Zoning Code, 
Section 10-5A-5. Affidavit of Mark Larsen, Record at 67-70. 
Plaintiffs filed suit against the Woolseys and South Weber City to halt 
construction and recover nuisance damages based on the placement of the home. 
Complaint, Record at 1. Plaintiffs argued that their lot's boundary with the 
Woolseys' lot does not and cannot constitute a side lot line, and therefore the rear-
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lot setback requirements must instead be enforced against the Woolseys with 
respect to Plaintiffs' boundary. Memorandum in Support of Preliminary 
Injunction, Record at 75, 79; Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, 
Record at 98, 100; Affidavit of Kerwin L. Jensen, Record at 180. The trial court 
granted the Woolseys' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
Woolseys cannot be sued on the alleged facts because there is no dispute that the 
Woolseys applied for and were issued a building permit by South Weber City for 
the proposed location of the home. Order, Record at 188, 190. The trial court also 
ruled, and the parties stipulated, that the dismissal could be treated as an entry of 
summary judgment on the trial court record for purposes of appeal. Order, Record 
at 188, 190-91. 
Defendant South Weber City has not moved for, and the trial court has 
taken no action with respect to, any dismissal as to the City. Plaintiffs' claims 
against the City therefore remain pending in the trial court. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court was incorrect in ruling that a private landowner cannot be 
sued for nuisance and injunctive relief arising from a structure if the landowner 
has complied with the City's instructions in building the structure. Defendants are 
subject to suit and may be held liable for their actions despite their compliance 
with the City's instructions. 
The trial court erred in alternatively granting summary judgment for 
Defendants. Because genuine disputes exist as to whether the home complies with 
the applicable zoning requirements and/or constitutes a nuisance, the entry of 
summary judgment for Defendants was improper. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A COMPLAINT FOR 
NUISANCE AND INJUNCTION AGAINST A PRIVATE PROPERTY 
OWNER FAILS TO STATE A COGNIZABLE LEGAL CLAIM IF THE 
OWNER HAS COMPLIED WITH EVERYTHING THE CITY ASKED THE 
OWNER TO DO IN THE PERMITTING AND BUILDING PROCESS. 
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that a private property owner who is 
building a house cannot be sued for zoning violation and/or nuisance if the owner has 
simply followed the instructions of the building department in the City in which the 
house is being built. Order, Record at 189-90. This legal conclusion is patently 
incorrect. 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) admits the facts alleged in the 
complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). In adjudicating a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1990). 
Applying these legal standards, the trial court should have denied Defendants' 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs 
have sustained private nuisance damages by Defendants' act of constructing their 
home too close to Plaintiffs' property and at too great a height. Second Amended 
Complaint, Record at 156, 156-59. Private nuisance is a cause of action for the 
invasion of a person's interests in the private use and enjoyment of land. Sanford v. 
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University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 744-45 (Utah 1971). In order to establish a prima 
facie claim for private nuisance, Plaintiffs must first allege that the invasion of their 
property by the acts of Defendants is substantial. Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 
939, 942 (Utah App. 1990). Next, if the nuisance liability is based on an intentional 
or negligent act of Defendants, Plaintiffs must allege that the interference with 
Plaintiffs' land caused by the acts of Defendants is unreasonable. Turnbaugh, 793 
P.2d at 942; Sanford, 488 P.2d at 744. If, however, the nuisance liability is based not 
on an intentional or negligent act, but instead on strict liability, such as a claim for 
nuisance per se, no allegation of unreasonableness is necessary. Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). When the conditions giving rise to a 
nuisance are also a violation of a statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a 
nuisance per se. Branch, 657 P.2d at 276. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fully satisfies the above standards for pleading a prima 
facie case of private nuisance. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants' acts of 
constructing their home in its current location and height have caused a substantial 
invasion of Plaintiffs' property rights, in that the home is in close proximity and view 
of Plaintiffs' property, thereby causing a substantial loss of privacy and diminution of 
property value to Plaintiffs in an amount greater than $100,000.00. Second Amended 
Complaint, Record at 156, 156-59. Furthermore, as required under negligence or 
intentional conduct theories, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Defendants' conduct in 
constructing the home in its current location and height was unreasonable. Second 
Amended Complaint, Record at 158. Finally, Plaintiffs Complaint also alleges that 
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Defendants are strictly liable for Defendants' damages under the doctrine of nuisance 
per se. Second Amended Complaint, Record at 158. If proven at trial, these 
allegations would require that judgment be entered for Plaintiffs. Because the court in 
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must accept all allegations as 
true, Defendants were not entitled to dismissal of the Complaint. 
The trial court's apparent belief that a landowner cannot be held liable or 
responsible if the City incorrectly interprets and applies its own ordinances is not a 
correct statement of Utah law. In Harper v. Summit County, 26 P.3d 193 (Utah 2001), 
both the municipality and the landowner were named as defendants in a nuisance 
action, even though the landowner had simply relied on the actions of the 
municipality in approving the contested use of the land. What the trial court in the 
instant case may be intending is that the Defendant landowners would have the right 
to maintain a cross-claim or an action for contribution against the City for its role in 
approving the building plans if the landowners are ultimately found liable. But 
instead the court incorrectly held that the landowners cannot be sued at all because 
they did what the City told them to do. On the contrary, the landowners are the most 
appropriate party defendant under Rule 17 and Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, because they are the ones who physically caused the allegedly offending 
structure to be built and they are the owners of the structure. A nuisance claim, of 
course, must name as a defendant the party who is alleged to have cause the nuisance. 
Because the complaint as framed in this action fully incriminates the landowners 
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under the governing law of nuisance and equitable relief, it is not subject to dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The trial court's holding that the Defendant landowners cannot be sued should 
be reversed. 
II. THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ON PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS' HOME VIOLATES THE ZONING 
ORDINANCE, CONSTITUTES A NUISANCE AND CONSTITUTES A 
NUISANCE PER SE. 
The trial court ruled in the alternative that the Defendant landowners were 
entitled to summary judgment. Order, Record at 188, 190-91. This ruling was also 
in error. 
Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings and affidavits on file show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court 
views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shieldy. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
In an affidavit submitted by Defendants, the City Building Inspector stated that 
he believes that the approval he granted for the home was justified because the 
boundary of Plaintiffs' lot can be considered a side lot line of Defendants' lot and 
therefore requires only a 10-foot setback. Affidavit of Mark Larsen, Record at 67-70. 
Plaintiffs, however, submitted an affidavit from an experienced building and zoning 
expert stating that the boundary of Plaintiffs' lot cannot qualify as a side lot line of 
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Defendants' lot but rather is a rear lot line. Affidavit of Kerwin L. Jensen, Record at 
180, 182. The map attached to Mr. Jensen's affidavit shows that the two homes on 
either side of the allegedly offending structure face the same direction, and face the 
same street, as the offending structure. Record at 183. For this reason, Mr. Jensen 
stated in his affidavit that the boundary of those homes cannot qualify as a rear line as 
the City Building Inspector apparently concluded in issuing his approval of the 
building plans. Affidavit of Kerwin L. Jensen, Record at 180, 182. Instead, the 
boundary with Plaintiffs' lot is the only legal rear lot line of the offending lot. 
Defendants cited no statute, ordinance or other provision in the trial court that 
would allow the de facto variance the City appears to have granted in this case. 
Contrary to the attempted after-the-fact assertions in Mr. Larsen's affidavit, the 
offending lot is not, and is not similar to, "a corner lot on a radius corner." Affidavit 
of Mark Larsen, Record at 68. Mr. Larsen's assertion that "the city ordinances allow 
for some leeway" in this instance is totally unsupported by any citation to applicable 
authority. Affidavit of Mark Larsen, Record at 68. The trial court's order of 
dismissal is similarly devoid of any such citation of authority. 
Because the above information presented to the trial court creates, at a 
minimum, genuine issues of dispute as to material facts, and because the summary 
judgment evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the trial 
court should not have granted summary judgment for Defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request that the order of dismissal and/or summary judgment entered 
in favor of Defendants be reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ / ^ day of July, 2004. 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
16 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant 
shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is 
complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is 
complete outside the state A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an 
answer thereto within twenty days after the service The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a 
counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is 
ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise 
directs The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a 
different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims 
in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action, 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement 
(b) How presented Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56 
17 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and 
served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
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Robert L. Froerer (#4574) 
FROERER Sc MILES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
707 - 24th Street, Suite A 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-2690 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL POPPERT and LORI 
POPPERT, 
Plaintiffs, 
) ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
vs. ) AS TO DEFENDANTS WOOLSEY 
MICHAEL WOOLSEY and HEIDI ) 
WOOLSEY, individuals; and ) Civil No. 030602897 
SOUTH WEBER CITY, a Utah body ) 
politic, ) 
Defendants. ) Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on for hearing on a Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants MICHAEL 
WOOLSEY and HEIDI WOOLSEY (hereinafter "WOOLSEYS"). Plaintiffs, 
though not present, were represented by counsel, Kraig J. Powell. 
Defendant MICHAEL WOOLSEY was present and represented by counsel, 
Robert L. Froerer. Defendant SOUTH WEBER CITY did not make an 
appearance, in that this Motion did not pertain to said 
Defendant's position in this lawsuit. 
The Court having reviewed the Motion filed by WOOLSEYS 
and the supporting Memoranda filed by WOOLSEYS and Plaintiffs, 
and having heard the arguments of the parties at this hearing, 
hereby orders this case dismissed as to WOOLSEYS, based on the 
Court's conclusions as follows: 
1. This matter was initially filed by Plaintiffs 
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alleging three separate causes of action; i.e., First Cause of 
Action alleging Nuisance; Second Cause of Action alleging 
Injunction; and Third Cause of Action alleging Fraud. 
2. Subsequent to the filing of the initial Complaint, 
Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, 
adding a Fourth Cause of Action alleging Zoning Enforcement. 
3. At this hearing, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss 
without prejudice their Third Cause of Action alleging Fraud, 
which Motion was granted. 
4. The Court determined that Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause 
of Action alleging Zoning Enforcement, was an action pertaining 
to Defendant SOUTH WEBER CITY only and did not pertain to 
WOOLSEYS. 
5. The Court finds that the issue herein pertaining to 
the remaining two causes of action; i.e., Nuisance and 
Injunction, is whether or not a cause of action for damages or 
injunction can be maintained against a private homeowner who 
complies with city zoning ordinances dealing with placement of 
their home on a subdivision lot in accordance with prescribed 
setback requirements. 
6. As pertaining to the remaining two causes of 
action; i.e., Nuisance and Injunction, the Court further finds 
that such causes of action are legally intertwined and concludes 
that both causes of action should be dismissed. 
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7. The Court concludes that, as a matter of law, an 
individual property owner should have no liability to a 
neighboring property owner for actions taken in compliance with 
zoning setback regulations required by the governmental entity, 
in this case, SOUTH WEBER CITY, pertaining to the real property 
in question. Therefore, there can be no successful claim against 
WOOLSEYS herein for either Nuisance or for a permanent Injunction 
to remove the WOOLSEYS' home from the property. 
8. This Court concludes that for Plaintiffs to be 
successful as to their First and Second Causes of Action, 
WOOLSEYS would have to have done something wrong; i.e., contrary 
to law, beyond simply complying with the regulations imposed by 
the governmental entity, SOUTH WEBER CITY. Based on the 
information provided to the Court through this hearing and on 
file herein, this Court concludes that there is nothing in the 
pleadings or in the information presented by Plaintiffs to 
indicate that WOOLSEYS did anything wrong or improper. 
9. There apparently is no Utah case law that either 
disposes of the issues herein or even assists in addressing the 
issues herein. This Court relies heavily on U.R.C.P. Rule 1, 
which requires the Rules of Civil Procedure to "...be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." 
10. In order to expedite resolution of this matter in 
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the trial court and on appeal, Plaintiffs and the WOOLSEYS have 
stipulated before the Court that, in the alternative, this Motion 
may also be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
WOOLSEYS on the grounds set forth in this Order, and on the 
entire factual record of the trial court. Therefore, by joint 
stipulation of the parties, the Court hereby alternatively grants 
Summary Judgment in favor of WOOLSEYS on said grounds and factual 
record. 
WHEREFORE, based on the findings and conclusions of the 
Court as stated above, this Court hereby dismisses Plaintiffs' 
Third Cause of Action, alleging Fraud, without prejudice. 
This Court further hereby dismisses, as to the 
WOOLSEYS, Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, alleging Nuisance, 
and Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, alleging a Request for 
Injunction. This Order shall operate and is hereby entered as a 
final Judgment as to WOOLSEYS, the Court finding that there is no 
just reason for delay pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
SO ORDERED this 7%aay of (k^J^ , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
mans L. KayK ~ T"77- %y**yi $ Thomaf  
District Couitk Judge *, 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Kraig J. Powell! 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
> >*,„****, 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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